This study discusses the characterization of the lexicographic maximin (leximin) choice rule using an axiom related to the Lorenz criterion, which states that a utility vector that Lorentz dominates a solution vector should not be Pareto dominated by any feasible vector, named Pareto Undominatedness of Lorenz-superior Distribution (PULSD). PULSD in itself does not imply that a solution vector of the choice rule is Lorenz undominated by any utility vectors in the feasible set. Therefore, we may say that the PULSD's requirement for inequality aversion is weak. Indeed, PULSD is consistent with the utilitarian choice rule, which is viewed as indifferent to equity. We show that the leximin choice rule is characterized by PULSD, combined with the Suppes-Sen optimality and the common ordinal invariance axiom.
Introduction
We consider a choice problem to select the optimal distribution from a set of feasible alternatives that represent utility vectors. The social planner may establish a choice rule, taking into account the equity property as well as the efficiency property. For the efficiency notion, the Suppes-Sen optimality (SSO) is well known and standard 1 . SSO requires that a solution utility vector be not . For the equity notion, the Lorentz criterion is renowned 4 . In general, for two utility vectors x and y, x is regarded as more inequality averse or equitable than y if x Lorenz dominates y. A solution vector may be required to be Lorenz undominated by any utility vectors in the feasible set, which we refer to as Lorenz undominatedness (LU). In this sense, LU requires that any vector that is more inequality-averse or equitable than a solution vector is not included in the feasible set.
Ok [11] proposed the notion that is obtained by combining LU with Pareto optimality, which is referred to as Lorenz-Pareto optimality (LPO). LPO requires that a solution be neither Pareto dominated nor Lorenz dominated by any vector in the feasible set. LPO is a refined notion of Pareto optimality containing the inequality-averse property. As Ok [11] demonstrated, provided that S is a compact and comprehensive set, GLO implies and is implied by the generalized Lorenz optimality (GLO), which requires that a solution vector be not generalized
Lorenz dominated by any feasible vector 5 .
The utilitarian choice rule, which aims to maximize the total utility and is viewed as indifferent to equality or equity, is inconsistent with LU, LPO, and GLO.
In contrast, the lexicographic maximin (leximin) choice rule, which is regarded as the representative egalitarian rule, satisfies all of them 6 . However, the leximin choice rule may be characterized without directly requiring a solution vector to be Mariotti [8] . 4 See Dasgupta, Sen, and Starrett [3] and Sen [14] . The Lorenz criterion they used is based on the well-known notion of Lorenz curve representing inequality with respect to income distribution. However, we use the Lorenz criterion with respect to utility distribution throughout the paper. See also Ok [11] . 5 See proposition 1 of Ok [11] (p. 309). For the notion of the generalized Lorenz dominance, see Shorrocks [15] , Madden [6] , and Ok [11] . 6 It will be shown later. 7 See also Nielsen [10] . 8 In Mori [9] , the leximin bargaining solution is characterized in the case of the two-person bargaining problem. The present study shows that the leximin choice rule can be characterized using similar axioms within the framework of a choice problem of society comprising ( ) The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the preliminaries of the analysis and the axioms. Section 3 provides a theorem and two corollaries about the characterization of the leximin choice rule. Section 4 provides concluding remarks.
Preliminaries and Axioms
We consider a society comprising ( ) 
, a function : 
. SSO requires that there be no utility vector s in the feasible set that Suppes-Sen dominates any solution utility vector t.
A standard notion used for representing the inequality aversion property is Lorenz dominance (LD), which is defined as follows: A utility vector . In words, LD 9 The notation of i s ↑ follows Mariotti [7] . 10 Sen [13] . 11 Madden [6] p.250.
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As is well-known, the notion of Suppes-Sen dominance is based on Suppes [16] and Sen [13] . 13 Dasgupta, Sen, and Starrett [3] , Sen [14] . Note that they state Lorenz dominance in terms of income, but we define it in terms of utility. See also Ok [11] . 
where
An axiom imposing the inequality aversion property on a solution vector is as follows.
Lorenz Undominatedness (LU): For any
LU requires that any utility vector ( )
for a solution utility vector t be not contained in the feasible set S. This implies that the distributional disparity of a solution utility vector should be reduced to the minimum 17 .
The notion of LD concerns the relation between two distributions whose total utilities are equal. When comparing two utility vectors whose total utilities are not equal, we can use the notion of the generalized Lorenz dominance (GLD), which is defined as follows 18 : A utility vector See Dasgupta, Sen, and Starrett [3] (lemma 2) and Sen [14] . For the proof of the theorem, see Berge [1] , pp.184-187. 15 For the theorem of Birkhoff-von Neumann, see von Neumann [19] , Berge [1] , pp.182-183, Sen [14] , and Dasgupta, Sen, and Starrett [3] (lemma 1). 16 It is possible that 
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Ok [11] discussed the notion of the Lorenz-Pareto frontier, which is a set of Pareto optimal vectors that are not Lorenz dominated by any utility vectors in the feasible set, and introduced the notion of Lorenz-Pareto optimality, which is defined in our framework as follows.
Lorenz-Pareto Optimality (LPO): For any
Ok [11] argued that for two Pareto optimal vectors x and y, and a vector z in the feasible set, when x Pareto dominates z which in turn Lorenz dominates y, it can be said that x clearly dominates y 21 . Ok [11] states that if this is the case, it may be said that a Lorenz-Pareto improvement over y is feasible, and that a vector u is Lorenz-Pareto optimal if and only if a Lorenz-Pareto improvement over u is infeasible 22 . Based on the discussion, we say that it is natural to consider that a feasible or infeasible distribution Satisfying PULSD means that no utility vector is more efficient than any utility vector that is more equitable than a solution vector. Note that PULSD does
for a solution utility vector t be excluded from S. In this sense, PULSD's requirement for equity is relatively weak.
It is certain that GLO implies SSO, LU, LPO and PULSD. Indeed, GLO is equivalent to the combination of SSO, LU, and PULSD.
Moreover, we introduce the following invariance axiom. However, it should be noted that COI is consistent with the supposition that individual utilities are cardinally measurable and interpersonally full-comparable.
In fact, COI is satisfied whenever for all i, ( )
Even in such a case, social planner may disregard how large or small the intrapersonal and interpersonal utility differences are. Hence, COI should be considered as the consistency condition with respect to any positive transformation.
Characterizing the Leximin Choice Rule
It is well-known and easily demonstrated that As mentioned in Introduction, it follows the weak ordinal invariance axiom in Thomson (p.1256) [18] . 25 For the discussion on the invariance axioms, see Bossert and Weymark [2] . Second, we prove that
axioms in the theorem. We suppose by contradiction that
Consider t such that
. Note that t is not a permutation of e. Our strategy for the proof is to demonstrate that a positive monotonic transformation of t, ( ) 
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However, we can find 
. We consider 
Note that 
violates PULSD. 
Concluding Remarks
It is interesting to clarify the difference between axiomatizations of the utilitarian and leximin choice rules. Mariotti [8] demonstrated that given a set of feasible social alternatives A, which is nonempty and compact, the utilitarian set of A coincides with the baseline independent Suppes-Sen maximal set of A (Theorem 1, p.299). This actually implies that the utilitarian choice rule ( ) U S is characterized by SSO and the translation invariance (TI) axiom 28 in our framework. D'Aspremont and Gevers [4] used social welfare functionals 29 and characterized the utilitarian and leximin social welfare orderings using the two sets of axioms between which the only difference lies in the invariance axiom. Analogously, in our formulation the utilitarian and leximin choice rules are characterized using the two sets of axioms that are incompatible only in the invariance axiom. Specifically, although both 
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As is well-known, the concept of social welfare functional was developed by Sen [13] . 
